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RECENT DECISIONS
GiFTS-TRusT CERTIFICATES-RETENTION BY ALLEGED DoNoR.-The plaintiff
trust company held $2500 in trust for one William Crowley. On December 1,
1933, Crowley went to the plaintiff company and executed an assignment of
the trust agreement to the defendant by placing the defendant's name on the
agreement as beneficiary. Then instead of giving the trust agreement to the
defendant who had accompanied him, he pointedly indicated that he was going
to keep it in his possession. On December 10, 1933, he made a will bequeathing
$850 to a niece. The plaintiff, as administrator, brought this suit after C's death
to determine the beneficial ownership of the fund represented by the certificate.
The trial court declared the defendant to be the owner of all rights under the
trust agreement dating such ownership from December 1, 1933, and dismissed
plaintiff's complaint. On appeal, held, judgment reversed; the trust certificate
was adjudged to be an asset of the estate. Madison Trust Co. v. Skogstroin
(Wis. 1936) 269 N.W. 249.
The circumstances surrounding an alleged gift must be carefully scrutinized
to determine the real intention of the donor. Additional investigation must be
made to see whether the intention was fully executed. Registering bonds in
the donee's name and endorsing the name of the donee on each bond is not
sufficient execution of a gift when the donor retains the bonds and collects the
coupons. Matter of Crawford, 113 N.Y. 560, 21 N.E. 692 (1889). A note executed
with donee as payee, but retained in donor's lockbox is not a completed gift.
Tobin v. Tobin, 139 Wis. 494, 121 N.W. 144 (1909). But such instruments may
be retained for specific purposes and an effective gift completed particularly
when there is an agreement between the donor and the donee that the donor
should keep possession of the instrument. Certificates of deposit may be exe-
cuted to donees, but kept in the donor's lockbox with the consent of the donees
for greater convenience to the donor in collecting the interest until his death.
Tucker v. Tucker, 138 Iowa 344, 116 N.W. 119 (1908). Similarly bonds bought
as a reward for service could be kept by the donor to collect interest until his
death. In re Dayton's Estate, 121 Neb. 402, 237 N.W. 303 (1931). Securities that
are an integral part of a family estate could be periodically given to members of
the family as gifts and remain in the possession of the donor for central man-
agement. Shepard v. Shepard, 164 Mich. 183, 129 N.W. 201 (1910). To make
such arrangements effective, a plan has generally been worked out between the
donor and donee. It is harder to establish a completed gift when the donor
retains possession and the donee is ignorant of the intended gift. However, a
valid gift, without the donee being aware of it, may be made when the donor
clearly establishes the legal possession of the donee. Mortgages may be assigned
as a valid gift and retained in the donor's possession for collection of the in-
terest until his death, if the mortgages are recorded in the name of the donees.
Here the transfer is effectively completed by placing it in the public records.
Henderson v. Hughes, 320 Pa. 124, 182 Atl. 392 (1936). A receipt from a bank
for two bonds deposited as a gift providing for delivery upon the death of the
donor is sufficient relinquishing of control to constitute a gift. Clough v. 1st
Nat'l Bank, 254 Mich. 298, 236 N.W. 790 (1931). Mailing a duplicate assign-
ment as required by an insurance company is sufficient to confer a beneficial
interest in the policy even though the donor retains the policy and one of the
assignments to protect his own remaining interest. Northwestern Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Wright, 153 Wis. 252, 140 N.W. 1078 (1913). If the gift is to
be made through the agency of a third party it is completed only when the
third party becomes the agent of the donee. Rents collected by an agent of the
donor as a gift do not pass to the donee until the collector becomes the
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donee's agent or they are actually given to the donee. Wells v. Collins, 74 Wis.
341, 43 N.W. 160 (1889). Death of the donor before delivery by the agent pre-
vents the gift from being completed. Trubey v. Pease, 240 Ill. 513, 88 N.E. 1005
(1909). None of the cases illustrates an effective gift where the donor retained
possession of the instrument, unless a definite plan had been set up allowing
retention by the donor for a specific benefit to him or the donee which was
more easily obtained through such retention. In the instant case the donor re-
fused to give up the instrument and no such plan could be derived from the
circumstances.
JOSEPH E. DEAN.
INJUNcTioNs-LABOR DISPUTES-WISCONsiN LABOR CoDE.-The plaintiff is a
corporation engaged in the retail furniture business. The principal defendant
is a labor union. The business agent of the union requested the plaintiff to
execute certain contracts with it providing for the recognition of the union as
the bargaining agent of the store's employees, for payment of the union wage
scale, and for regulation of hours of labor. The plaintiff refused to deal with
the union until it could ascertain the will of its own employees. The employees
twice by secret ballot voted against the union's plan. The plaintiff-employer then
refused to bargain with the union. The union declared a labor dispute in prog-
ress and picketed the plaintiff's store. The plaintiff sought to enjoin this action
of the union. Its request for an injunction was denied although the trial judge
did define and limit the kind of picketing in which the union members might
engage. On appeal, held, judgment affirmed; the Wisconsin Labor Code permits
picketing under the circumstances disclosed. American Furniture Co. v. I. B. of
T. C. and H. of A., etc., (Wis. 1936) 268 N.W. 250.
The Wisconsin Labor Code [WIs. STAT. (1935) §§ 103.51-103.63] adopts the
provisions of the federal statute, the Norris-LaGuardia Act [29 U.S.C.A. §§ 191-
115 (1936), 47 STAT. 70 et seq. (1932)]. Experiences of labor unions under the
Sherman Act [26 Stat. 209 (1890)] and the Clayton Act [38 Stat. 730 (1914)]
led to the enactment of the Norris-La Guardia Act. The Sherman Act was
aimed at conspiracies in restraint of trade and commerce. A union boycott of a
manufacturer's. products, affecting the manufacturer and sub-dealers was held
to be a conspiracy in restraint of trade and within the prohibition of the Sher-
man Act. Lowe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 28 Sup. Ct. 301, 52 L.ed. 488 (1908).
Section 6 of the Clayton Act, adopted thereafter, provided that nothing in the
anti-trust laws should be construed to forbid the existence of labor unions or
to forbid individual members from carrying out the legitimate objects of trade
unions. 15 U.S.C.A. § 17 (1926), 38 STAT. 731 (1914). The Act also provided that
no injunctions should issue against peaceful picketing. 29 U.S.C.A. § 15 (1926),
38 STAT. 738 (1914). Nevertheless it was subsequently held by the Supreme
Court that an injunction should issue against union boycotts when the pickets
and boycotters were not employees of the particular employer involved. Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 433, 41 Sup. Ct. 172, 65 L.ed. 349 (1921).
The Norris-La Guardia Act was intended to circumscribe the powers of federal
equity courts in interfering in labor disputes. The Act re-defines labor disputes
as controversies concerning terms or conditions of employment, or the matter
of representation in negotiation for terms of employment, whether or not the
disputants stand toward each other in the relationship of employer-employee.
29 U.S.C.A. § 107 (1936), 47 STAT. 71 (1932). This statute has been twice con-
sidered by the Circuit Court of Appeals in the Seventh Circuit. In each case the
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